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The WTO dispute settlement system represents a major achievement of the Uruguay 
Round. By most accounts, this system has worked very well. In the ongoing dispute 
settlement understanding (DSU) review, WTO Members are considering proposals that 
might lead to further improvements in the functioning of the dispute settlement system. 
Many of these proposals concern different kinds of remedies that might be used in 
response to a violation.  
 
An evaluation of proposals for remedy reform requires a perspective as to the purpose of 
the WTO. In this essay, I describe and then apply the terms-of-trade theory of trade 
agreements. I argue that this theory offers a coherent interpretation of the purpose and 
design of the WTO. The theory also offers novel insights with respect to proposed 
reforms of the WTO remedy system. 
 
In Section 2, I argue that the terms-of-trade theory provides a rationale for trade 
agreements and an interpretation of key GATT/WTO design features. Next, in Section 3, 
I apply this theory and consider the extent to which WTO remedies facilitate efficient 
breach. I conclude that a theoretical argument can be made in favor of a modified dispute 
settlement system that allows for disproportionate retaliation, particularly in response to 
serious violations. At a practical level, however, I argue that important measurement 
problems would significantly limit the feasibility of such an approach. The current 
system, which is based on commensurate retaliation (i.e., the suspension of equivalent 
concessions), may sometimes allow for inefficient breach but arguably works well in an 
overall sense. I suggest as well that rule changes that encourage greater use of monetary 
compensation may be attractive. 
 
In Section 4, I consider Mexico’s proposal that retaliation rights be made tradable. I 
develop here a theoretical perspective that identifies some potential benefits that such a 
system might offer. Among these, I highlight in particular the possibility that a system 
with tradable retaliation rights might facilitate the payment of monetary compensation to 
a small-country complainant by a large country which resists bringing its offending 
measures into compliance. I also stress that such a system could introduce a number of 
additional effects that are at present not well understood. At this stage, I thus caution 
against any explicit change in the DSU to accommodate tradable retaliation rights. I 
suggest instead that this proposal receive further serious study. 
 
The topic of Section 5 is the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the 
SCM Agreement) and the remedies described therein. I argue that the terms-of-trade 
approach to trade agreements indicates that the restrictions on domestic and export 
subsidies found in the SCM Agreement are too severe. Likewise, this theory does not 
support the rulings in recent disputes, which recommend disproportionate 





2. The purpose and design of trade agreements 
 
WTO remedies can be meaningfully interpreted and evaluated only in the context of an 
understanding as to the purpose of the WTO. I thus begin my discussion by addressing 
the following question: What is the problem that a trade agreement might solve? After 
proposing an answer to this question, I relate this answer to a few key design features of 
GATT and the WTO. 
 
2a. The purpose of trade agreements 
 
Motivated by GATT and the WTO, I treat a trade agreement as an agreement between 
governments. This perspective implies that a trade agreement is designed to offer greater 
welfare to governments than they would obtain in the absence of the agreement. In turn, a 
trade agreement can offer greater government welfare only if some inefficiency arises 
relative to the preferences of governments when trade policies are set in a unilateral 
fashion. At a broad level, the purpose of a trade agreement is then to eliminate this 
inefficiency and thereby facilitate mutual gains for the participating governments.  
 
The key task is to identify the source of the inefficiency. To this end, it is instructive to 
imagine a simple setting with two countries, where each country imports a single good 
from its trading partner. Each government can use an import tariff to restrict imports, and 
for simplicity I assume that no other trade-policy instruments are available. Even in this 
simple setting, a government confronts subtle tradeoffs when determining its optimal 
unilateral tariff. A higher tariff raises the price of the import good in the domestic 
economy, and the higher “local price” is beneficial to import-competing firms but 
harmful to domestic consumers. Also, a higher tariff increases tariff revenue, if the initial 
tariff is below the level that maximizes tariff revenue. Thus, when contemplating a higher 
tariff, a government must balance the benefits of greater profit in the import-competing 
industry and perhaps greater tariff revenue against the costs of lower consumer welfare. 
The optimal unilateral tariff then reflects the respective importance of these benefits and 
costs in the government’s welfare function. 
 
The domestic government’s calculus, however, neglects one important group: foreign 
exporters. When a government raises its unilateral tariff, the “world price” of the import 
good may fall. In this case, the profits of foreign exporters decline as a consequence of 
the increased tariff.  An increase in the import tariff then imposes a negative externality 
on foreign exporters. Naturally, the welfare of the foreign government is reduced when 
its exporters receive lower profits.1 Thus, when a government selects a higher tariff, it 
imposes a negative international externality on foreign government welfare.2  In the 
absence of a trade agreement, governments do not internalize this international 
                                                
1 An increase in the domestic tariff also causes a decline in the local price of the good in the foreign country 
and thus generates a benefit to foreign consumers in the form of a lower price on units traded within the 
foreign country. This benefit, however, amounts to a transfer from foreign producers to foreign consumers. 
2 Formally, this statement is sure to hold when the foreign government is choosing its optimal unilateral 
tariff, as the discussion here presumes. See Bagwell and Staiger (2002, Appendix, p. 192, equation (A6)). 
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externality, and so import tariffs are higher - and trade volumes are lower - than would be 
efficient, where efficiency is measured relative to the objectives of both governments.  
 
According to this line of reasoning, the problem that motivates the formation of a trade 
agreement is that a negative international externality flows from a government’s chosen 
trade policy through world prices to another government’s welfare.3 In the absence of a 
trade agreement, this problem results in an inefficient outcome. The purpose of a trade 
agreement is then to enable governments to lower tariffs and raise trade volumes so that 
they may achieve a more efficient outcome. 
 
The rationale for trade agreements provided here is sometimes called the terms-of-trade 
theory of trade agreements. In a simple two-good setting, a country’s terms of trade is the 
price of its export good divided by price of its import good, with all prices evaluated on 
world markets. All else equal, a country generally enjoys greater national welfare when 
its terms of trade are higher. Intuitively, a country can make a better trade (get more 
imports in exchange for its exports) on world markets when its terms of trade improve. In 
the context of the discussion above, when a government imposes a higher import tariff, it 
depresses the world price of its import good and thereby engineers a terms-of-trade gain. 
At the same time, the higher tariff results in a terms-of-trade loss for the trading partner, 
since the world price of the trading partner’s export good is correspondingly reduced. The 
international externality described above is thus a terms-of-trade externality. 
 
The terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements is hardly new. Mill (1814) and Torrens 
(1844) offer early discussions, and Johnson (1953-54) provides an elegant formalization. 
Some economists, however, have objected to this theory as a foundation from which to 
interpret and evaluate actual trade agreements. Two objections are noted here. First, the 
traditional version of the theory assumes that each government seeks to maximize 
national income. This specification for government preferences is unrealistic, as it leaves 
out the manifest political constraints under which real governments operate. Second, in 
actual trade-policy debates and negotiations, the “terms of trade” are rarely mentioned. 
 
Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002 (Chapters 2, 11), 2005a) enrich the traditional terms-of 
trade theory and argue that these objections are misguided. Consider first the preferences 
of governments. Notice that nowhere in the rationale for trade agreements presented 
above is the assumption made that governments maximize national income. This reflects 
a general point: the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements is robust to a wide range of 
government preference specifications, including specifications that allow for political 
motivations and constraints. The preferences of a government can be specified as a 
general function of local prices and world prices, and political considerations can be 
captured by the manner in which local prices affect government welfare. For example, if 
                                                
3 A second problem that may motivate the formation of a trade agreement is present when governments 
have difficulties in making credible commitments with regard to their trade policies. Governments may 
then look to a trade agreement as a means through which they may make such commitments. See Bagwell 
and Staiger (2002, Chapter 2) for further discussion of the commitment approach. I simply note here that 
this approach is in some ways difficult to reconcile with the substantial opportunities for “rebalancing” that 
the GATT/WTO system affords (as discussed in more detail below). On this point, see also Kohler (2004). 
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an import-competing industry is politically powerful, then the government may be more 
attracted to a higher local price for the corresponding import good. The theory does not 
require any restrictions on government preferences with regard to local prices, however, 
and thus accommodates a range of possible political motivations.  
 
The second objection can also be addressed. It is true that the “terms of trade” are not 
often featured in actual trade-policy debates and negotiations. Instead, such discussions 
often highlight the market access implications of trade policy. The loss in market access 
that foreign exporters experience when the domestic country raises its tariff, however, is 
simply the “quantity effect” that accompanies the “price effect” of a deterioration in the 
foreign country’s terms of trade. From this point of view, whether an increase in the 
domestic country’s tariff is said to cause a “terms of trade loss for the foreign country” or 
a “loss of market access for foreign exporters” is purely a matter of semantics.4 
 
In fact, the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements rests on only two key assumptions. 
The first assumption is that government preferences are such that, all else equal, a 
government suffers a welfare loss when its country’s terms of trade deteriorate. This 
assumption seems quite reasonable and holds when governments maximize national 
income as well as in the leading political-economy models of trade policy. The second 
key assumption is that an increase in an import tariff results in a terms-of-trade gain for 
the importing country and thus a terms-of-trade loss for the exporting country. As I 
discuss below, this assumption holds if the importing country is “large.” Together, the 
two key assumptions ensure that a negative international externality flows from one 
government’s import tariff to the government welfare function of its trading partner. 
 
The assumption of “large” countries merits additional discussion. When the government 
of a large country raises its import tariff, the import good becomes more plentiful on the 
world market, forcing a reduction in the world price of the good. The government of a 
large country can thus improve its terms of trade – and diminish the terms of trade of its 
trading partner – by raising its import tariff. By contrast, a small country has no “market 
power” in this sense. When the government of a small country raises its import tariff, the 
price of the good on the world market is unchanged, and the full tariff increase is thus 
“passed through” as an increase in the local price.  Since the government of a small 
country cannot alter world prices, no international externality flows to other governments 
from its tariff policies.  This discussion leads to a simple but powerful implication: 
according to the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements, the government of a small 
country should be free from any obligation on its tariff policy and therefore permitted to 
choose any tariff policy that it likes. Intuitively, all of the costs and benefits of a tariff 
change for such a government move through the local prices within the country and thus 
reside entirely within national boundaries. 
 
                                                
4 Recent empirical work also reports evidence that is consistent with the terms-of-trade theory of trade 
agreements. See, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (2006a), Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2006) and 
Subramanian and Wei (forthcoming).  Other supportive studies are mentioned below in footnote 22 and 
also in Bagwell and Staiger (2002, Chapter 11). 
 5 
The sharp distinction between large and small countries is useful at an abstract level. In 
reality, however, the distinction is probably one of degree. A country may be large with 
respect to the importation of one good and small with respect to the importation of other 
goods. For example, Country A may be only a small player in the world market for good 
x. If the import tariff for good x in Country A were increased 10%, then the world price 
of this good would not change and the local price of good x within Country A would rise 
the full 10%. At the same time, Country A may import good y from the neighboring 
Country B. Due to high transport costs or the highly perishable nature of good y, Country 
B may only export good y to Country A and other neighboring countries. As a 
consequence, Country A may be large with respect to the relevant world price of good y. 
Thus, rather than categorizing countries as “large” or “small,” it may be more reasonable 
to think of some countries as being larger (i.e, large in more markets) than others. 
 
2b. The Design of GATT/WTO 
 
The theoretical perspective described above offers an interpretation of key features of 
GATT/WTO design. In particular, it provides an interpretation of the principle of 
reciprocity, the nondiscrimination rule reflected in the most-favored nation principle 
(MFN) and the roles of retaliation. 
 
Consider first the interpretation of reciprocity in the GATT/WTO. In broad terms, the 
principle of reciprocity refers to the ideal of mutual changes in trade policy that bring 
about changes in the volume of each country’s imports that are of equal value to changes 
in the volume of its exports. This principle is pervasive in the GATT/WTO. Reciprocity 
arises as a norm in GATT/WTO negotiations, where governments often seek a “balance 
of concessions.” Reciprocity also appears in many GATT/WTO rules. For example, 
GATT Article XXVIII provides circumstances under which a concession withdrawal by 
one government can entitle another to withdraw a “substantially equivalent concession.” 
Likewise, reciprocity is a fundamental feature of the treatment of remedies in the 
GATT/WTO. As I discuss in more detail below, under the DSU of the WTO, a Member 
country that violates an obligation and refuses to comply may suffer an equivalent 
withdrawal of concessions from its trading partner. 
 
The principle of reciprocity is often maligned as a mercantilist concept that is devoid of 
economic content. Advocates of this point of view stress that unilateral liberalization to 
free trade is the only sensible policy from an economic perspective, and they often lament 
that the selection of a positive tariff amounts to “shooting oneself in the foot.” As a 
foundation from which to interpret the GATT/WTO, however, this view suffers from two 
fatal flaws. First, given its recommendation of unilateral liberalization, this view cannot 
provide an interpretation of the purpose and design of the GATT/WTO, wherein the 
principle of reciprocity is foundational. Second, as a matter of theory, a policy of 
unilateral free trade is optimal for a government under rather special conditions; in 
particular, the government must maximize national income and preside over a small 
country. As discussed above, however, real governments often have political-economic 
objectives and preside over countries that are large, at least in some markets. 
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By contrast, the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements provides an economic 
interpretation of reciprocity. In the absence of a trade agreement, a government would set 
its optimal unilateral tariff. By definition, it would then not gain by offering a unilateral 
tariff reduction or increase. The underlying reason that a unilateral tariff reduction is 
unattractive is that it would diminish the country’s terms of trade. Suppose, though, that 
the governments negotiate a reciprocal reduction in tariffs. If the negotiated tariff 
concessions satisfy the principle of reciprocity, then the terms of trade would not change. 
At an intuitive level, this is because a reduction in the import tariff selected by the 
domestic government raises the price of the domestic import good on the world market, 
and likewise a reduction in the import tariff selected by the foreign government raises the 
price of the domestic export good on the world market. When governments liberalize 
according to the principle of reciprocity, they are thus able to achieve lower tariffs and 
higher trade volumes without requiring that any country experience a terms-of-trade loss. 
Terms-of-trade preservation is the key advantage that reciprocal liberalization offers over 
unilateral liberalization. Building from this line of reasoning, it can then be shown that 
both governments must gain when they form a trade agreement in which they negotiate a 
(modest) reciprocal liberalization in tariffs.5   
 
The discussion to this point has been conducted in the context of a two-country setting. 
The analytic framework can be extended to include multiple countries, however, and this 
extension leads to an economic interpretation of another key GATT/WTO design feature: 
the MFN principle of nondiscrimination. To fix ideas, consider an extended three-country 
framework in which the home country imports good x from foreign country 1 and foreign 
country 2. Each foreign country also imports good y from the home country. For 
simplicity, suppose further that the foreign countries do not trade with one another. 
Imagine now that the governments of the home country and foreign country 1 negotiate a 
trade agreement. As described above, the two governments achieve higher welfare under 
the agreement by exchanging reciprocal tariff reductions that preserve the terms of trade 
between them. The negotiated agreement thereby ensures that the exporters in each 
country gain additional access to the trading partner’s market. I now add a wrinkle and 
suppose that the home government has a subsequent opportunity to negotiate reciprocal 
tariff concessions with foreign country 2. In the absence of a nondiscrimination rule, the 
home government might offer foreign country 2 a lower tariff for imports of good x than 
it offered earlier to foreign country 1. This would have the effect of reducing home 
demand for exports from foreign country 1. In this general way, when discriminatory 
tariffs are permitted, a subsequent agreement can lead to a terms-of-trade loss for the 
early negotiating partner. Equivalently, a subsequent agreement can erode the negotiated 
                                                
5 When contemplating a unilateral tariff increase, a government balances the benefit of improved terms of 
trade against the welfare implications of a higher local price for the import good. At the optimal unilateral 
tariff, the government resists pushing the tariff higher yet (and enjoying the consequent improvement in its 
terms of trade), because the local price has already been pushed above the preferred level in the pursuit of 
terms-of-trade gains. Thus, at the optimal unilateral tariff, the government would be happy to lower its 
tariff and enjoy the lower local price, if there were a way to do this without suffering a terms-of-trade loss. 
A reciprocal reduction in tariffs accomplishes this objective. It is important that the reciprocal liberalization 
is not too large, however, lest the governments drive their local prices for import goods to levels that are 
lower than they prefer (given the terms of trade). See Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002 (Chapter 4)) for 
further details and proofs of the results on reciprocity described in this paragraph. 
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market access of the early negotiation partner. If the early negotiating partner foresees 
this possibility, it might hesitate to offer access to its market as part of an initial 
negotiation. An important role for a nondiscrimination rule is thus suggested: such a rule 
can help protect the interests of early negotiation partners and thereby facilitate trade 
liberalization across partners over time.6 
 
The nondiscrimination rule alone, however, is not sufficient to fully protect the welfare of 
the early negotiation partner. In particular, it could be the case that the subsequent 
negotiation does not satisfy the principle of reciprocity, in the sense that foreign country 
2 offers a greater concession than does the home country. Under the nondiscrimination 
rule, the exporters in foreign country 1 would receive the home country’s concession as 
well, and in this regard the exporters in foreign country 1 would enjoy a modest gain. 
Note, though, that the large concession offered by foreign country 2 raises the price of the 
home-country export (good y) on the world market. The subsequent negotiation thus 
raises the world price of the import good for foreign country 1 and thereby results in a 
large loss for consumers in foreign country 1. In this situation, the subsequent negotiation 
thus leads to a terms-of-trade loss for foreign country 1. Building on this line of 
argument, it can be shown that foreign country 1’s terms of trade - and thus the welfare of 
the government of foreign country 1 - is fully preserved when the subsequent negotiation 
satisfies the nondiscrimination rule and the principle of reciprocity.7  I return to the roles 
of nondiscrimination and reciprocity below, in my discussion of the WTO remedy system 
and some reform proposals.  
 
The terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements also suggests two important roles for 
retaliation. The first role emerges directly from the discussion above. I emphasize above 
that governments achieve welfare gains by negotiating reciprocal tariff reductions. 
Starting at the optimal unilateral tariffs, no government is attracted to a unilateral tariff 
cut. The reverse argument can be applied once governments have reciprocally lowered 
their tariffs to efficient levels. Starting at the efficient tariffs, each government would 
gain if it alone raised its tariff toward the optimal unilateral level. Each government 
would lose, however, if they both raised their tariffs in this fashion and thereby “undid” 
the reciprocal liberalization. In short, the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements 
indicates that governments face a Prisoners’ Dilemma problem: gains from cooperation 
exist, but each party has an incentive to cheat. As is well known, when parties interact 
repeatedly in a Prisoners’ Dilemma setting, they may utilize the threat of retaliation to 
achieve a self-enforcing cooperative arrangement. In their negotiations over trade 
policies, governments certainly interact repeatedly over time. It is thus possible that they 
may utilize the threat of retaliation to construct a self-enforcing agreement in which they 
cooperate (set low tariffs). For cooperation to emerge as part of a self-enforcing 
                                                
6 My discussion in this paragraph draws on Schwartz and Sykes (1997). 
7 The subsequent negotiation can affect government welfare in foreign country 1 only by altering foreign 
country 1’s terms of trade, since the import tariff in foreign country 1 does not change during the 
subsequent negotiation and thus does not induce any separate change in the local price in foreign country 1. 
See Bagwell and Staiger (2002 (Chapter 5), 2005a) for further discussion and a proof that the early 
negotiating partner’s terms of trade are maintained when the subsequent negotiation satisfies the 
nondiscrimination rule and the principle of reciprocity. 
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agreement, the key point is that the short-term benefit that any government might enjoy 
by cheating must be small in comparison to the long-term cost that the government would 
face if such cheating led to a retaliatory tariff increase by its trading partner and thus an 
undoing of the original reciprocal liberalization. 
 
According to this perspective, the role of retaliation is to induce compliance. This 
perspective has a certain appeal. There are no WTO police, and governments can be 
expected to honor agreements only in so far as it is in their interest to do so. The long-
term costs of retaliation must therefore outweigh the short-term gains from cheating. It is 
reasonable to assume that governments respond to this comparison at some basic level. 
Some anecdotal support for this assumption, for example, is provided in Croome’s (1995) 
discussion of the challenges facing governments as they sought to enhance GATT’s 
dispute settlement procedures as part of the Uruguay Round. Croome (1995, pp. 11-12) 
quotes then-Director General Arthur Dunkel as follows:  
 
“Dunkel summed up his view from the GATT Secretariat in a speech in London in March 
1991. He concluded that governments were being restrained from a substantial slippage 
towards protectionism only by ‘a kind of balance of terror’: a fear that if they resorted to 
trade restrictions these would evoke retaliation, as well as undermining the trading 
system as a whole.” 
 
As this quote suggests, governments may comply with GATT/WTO rules in part because 
to do otherwise would increase the probability of retaliatory tariffs and perhaps even 
imperil the credibility of the trading system. 
 
Of course, compliance may be induced even when less severe expressions of retaliation 
are entertained. In its most pure form, however, the compliance-inducement view of 
retaliation indicates that it is only the threat of retaliation that matters. If this threat is 
sufficiently severe, governments will not cheat and actual retaliation will not occur. If the 
view is taken that the only role for retaliation is to induce compliance, then the apparent 
normative implication is that retaliation should be severe and used as a punitive 
instrument with which to decrease the welfare of the cheating government. By increasing 
the long-term cost of cheating in this way, governments would be able to enforce more 
efficient (lower) tariffs, even though such tariffs may be associated with a greater 
incentive to cheat.  
 
While the “balance of terror” surely encourages governments to treat their WTO 
obligations with greater respect, it seems clear that the role of retaliation in WTO practice 
extends beyond the inducement of compliance. As noted, if compliance-inducement were 
the only purpose for retaliation in the WTO, then severe punishments would follow non-
compliance. This simple prediction is hard to square with WTO remedy rules. According 
to Article 22 of the DSU, if a WTO member is found to have a measure that is in 
violation of its WTO obligations and fails to bring that measure into compliance within a 
reasonable period of time, and if the infringing Member and the complaining Member are 
unable to agree upon mutually acceptable compensation, then the complaining Member 
may request authorization to suspend concessions to the infringing Member. Article 22.4 
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of the DSU then indicates that the “level of the suspension of concessions or other 
obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or 
impairment” (italics added). WTO remedy rules thus evoke the principle of reciprocity 
and place limits on the extent of authorized retaliation.8 
 
A second role for retaliation is that it may promote efficiency-enhancing rebalancing and 
thereby facilitate efficient breach.9 This perspective emphasizes that trade agreements can 
be understood as incomplete contracts that are negotiated between governments with 
political-economic objectives in the presence of considerable uncertainty as to future 
political and market conditions. At the time of the original negotiation, for example, 
governments may agree to select efficient tariffs. Later on, however, market conditions or 
the political landscape may change and alter governments’ welfare functions. The tariffs 
that governments regard as being efficient thus may change over time. In recognition of 
this possibility, governments may seek to design a trade agreement that is sufficiently 
flexible as to enable them to renegotiate the bargain over time. Under this perspective, 
retaliation may be useful as a means to increase the probability that renegotiation is 
efficiency enhancing for governments and not an opportunistic maneuver that benefits 
one government at the expense of another.  
 
The economic theory of contract remedies suggests that contracts should be designed to 
encourage efficient breach and to discourage inefficient breach. An efficient breach 
occurs when the promisor is able to gain from the breach even after placing the 
promisee(s) in as good a position as the promisee(s) would have enjoyed had 
performance been rendered. Schwartz and Sykes (2002) and Sykes (2000) make a 
provocative case that GATT/WTO rules are designed to facilitate efficient breach. In this 
context, retaliation (i.e., the withdrawal of substantially equivalent concessions) could 
play an important role, if it serves as the means through which a government maintains its 
welfare in the event that another government “breaches” and withdraws a concession.  
 
The key ideas can be more deeply explored in the context of the two-country setting 
described previously. Following an initial negotiation, suppose that a change in the 
political landscape leads the domestic government to value more heavily the well-being 
of its import-competing industry. After the change in political circumstances, the 
domestic government becomes more attracted to a higher local price for its import good, 
and the tariffs originally negotiated are no longer efficient. One approach would be to 
allow the domestic government to achieve a higher local price by unilaterally raising its 
tariff. This act, however, would also lower the world price of its import good and thereby 
impose a negative terms-of-trade externality on its trading partner. An approach that 
                                                
8
 As Lawrence (2003, pp. 35-6) observes, further evidence that remedies are not exclusively designed to 
induce compliance is apparent from the fact that the same remedy procedures (i.e., equivalent withdrawal 
of concessions if compensation fails) apply for both violation and non-violation complaints, even though 
under DSU Article 26.1 a WTO Member whose measure nullifies or impairs benefits without being in 
violation of the agreement is under no obligation to withdraw the measure. 
9 For further discussion of the rebalancing role of retaliation, see Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002 
(Chapters 4-6)), Howse and Staiger (2005), Kohler (2004), Lawrence (2003), Schwartz and Sykes (2002) 
and Sykes (1991, 2000). 
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permits unilateral flexibility would thus encourage opportunistic behavior and lead to 
inefficient breaches. An alternative approach features commensurate retaliation: the 
foreign government is allowed to respond to the domestic government’s tariff increase by 
reciprocally raising its own tariff to an equivalent degree. As discussed above, a 
reciprocal tariff adjustment preserves the terms of trade and thus ensures that the foreign 
country does not suffer a terms-of-trade loss. A renegotiation approach that features 
commensurate retaliation thus mitigates the scope for opportunism.  
 
Unfortunately, however, as Lawrence (2003, pp. 36-9) correctly argues, such an approach 
does not guarantee that the welfare of the foreign government is maintained. Intuitively, 
commensurate retaliation preserves the terms of trade but requires an increase in the 
foreign tariff. Under commensurate retaliation, it thus follows that in each country the 
local price of the import good is higher relative to the local price of the export good than 
was the case at the originally negotiated tariffs. The resulting change in the local prices is 
associated with reduced trade volume. It is possible, however, that at the originally 
negotiated tariffs, the foreign government would prefer local prices that generate 
(weakly) more trade volume, given the terms of trade. In this case, even though 
commensurate retaliation preserves the terms of trade, it nevertheless alters local prices 
and thereby introduces an internal inefficiency that is suffered by the foreign government. 
Thus, there is no guarantee that the foreign government is “made whole” under a system 
that allows for commensurate retaliation, and as a consequence it cannot be concluded 
that all such renegotiations can be understood as efficient breaches.10 
 
While a renegotiation process that features commensurate retaliation is therefore not a 
perfect means of facilitating efficient breach, it may be argued that such a process works 
well in a rough sense and thus enhances the extent to which a trade agreement can deliver 
efficient outcomes for its member governments. My discussion above addresses the 
possibility that such a process may enable governments to achieve more efficient 
outcomes in an ex post sense (i.e., after an unanticipated shock is experienced). It is also 
true that such a process may generate efficiency benefits at an ex ante level. Governments 
may be more willing to liberalize aggressively, if they know the process is sufficiently 
flexible to allow for (non-opportunistic) renegotiation when circumstances change.11 
 
The rebalancing role for retaliation suggests an interpretation of GATT/WTO rules and 
remedies.  First, GATT/WTO rules allow that governments may undertake a 
renegotiation in a manner that is consistent with their GATT/WTO obligations. GATT 
Article XXVIII, in particular, allows a country to withdraw concessions and entitles its 
trading partner (or partners) to withdraw “substantially equivalent concessions.” Second, 
if a WTO Member is found in violation of its obligations and elects not to comply and 
                                                
10 Note that, conditional on the increase in the domestic tariff, the foreign country does better by retaliating 
in a commensurate way than by not retaliating. This is because the act of retaliation restores the terms of 
trade. As discussed in the text, the foreign government may have done better yet if the domestic tariff were 
not raised to begin with. My discussion here invokes an assumption that the retaliatory tariff is not so high 
as to rise above the foreign government’s “best response” tariff.  
11 For an early statement of this point, see Dam (1970, p. 80). Bagwell and Staiger (1990) and Sykes (1991) 
develop the point further with reference to the escape clause provided by GATT Article XIX. 
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any attempts at compensation fail, then as noted previously Article 22.4 of the DSU 
allows that the complaining Member may be granted authorization to suspend 
concessions to an “equivalent” degree. Despite the fact that these scenarios differ in terms 
of the legality of the initial measure, they describe a remarkably similar economic 
process; in both scenarios, one party may withdraw a concession (raise a tariff, e.g.) and 
instigate thereby the withdrawal of an equivalent concession from its trading partner.12 A 
key point is that in both scenarios the extent of retaliation is limited to be of an equivalent 
degree. I remarked earlier that the compliance-inducement role for retaliation is difficult 
to reconcile with the emphasis on commensurate retaliation found in GATT/WTO rules. 
By contrast, the rebalancing role of retaliation offers a possible interpretation under 
which commensurate retaliation facilitates (albeit imperfectly) efficient breach. 
 
Having described a political-economic framework within which to contemplate the 
purpose and design of the WTO, I now turn to consider proposed reforms of the WTO 
remedy system. Building on the preceding discussion, I begin by considering whether the 
remedy system might function better were changes made that allowed for 
disproportionate retaliation and monetary compensation. I then consider the advantages 
and disadvantages of tradable retaliation rights. Finally, I comment on the economic 
rationale (or lack thereof) for the SCM Agreement and suggest as well modifications to 
the treatment of remedies in this agreement. 
 
3. Disproportionate Retaliation and Monetary Compensation 
 
The DSU of the WTO employs a compliance-compensation-retaliation remedy system. 
The essential sequence is described in DSU Article 22 and may be briefly summarized as 
follows. In the event that a WTO Member is determined to have a measure that is 
inconsistent with its WTO obligations, the preferred solution is that it comply and bring 
its measure into conformity. The Member concerned, however, may fail to bring its 
measure into compliance within a reasonable period of time. In the event that compliance 
is not forthcoming, the infringing Member may enter into negotiations with the 
complaining Member and explore the possibility of mutually acceptable compensation. 
Finally, if mutually acceptable compensation is not agreed upon, the complaining 
Member may request authorization from the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to suspend 
concessions or other obligations as they apply to the infringing Member. 
 
Most commentators agree that the compliance record has been good. With some very 
important exceptions, parties that are subject to adverse rulings bring their offending 
measures into compliance with their WTO obligations, or at least do so to a sufficient 
extent that the complaining party accepts the implementation.13 The compensation option 
                                                
12 The two scenarios are different in other respects. The suspension of concessions under Article 22.4 of the 
DSU provides that the complaining party can use discriminatory tariffs on a temporary basis, whereas 
renegotiation under GATT Article XXVIII seems to refer to a permanent rescheduling of 
nondiscriminatory tariffs. I return to this distinction in the next section. For further discussion of GATT 
Article XXVIII, see Mavroidis (2005, pp. 87-102).  
13 Davey (2005) considers the 181 disputes started with a consultation request prior to July 1, 2002. Of the 
63 disputes for which panel reports were adopted as of September 2005 and the dispute was won by the 
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has been used very rarely, although it is possible that parties agree upon compensation 
without formally notifying the WTO.14 Finally, retaliation is not often used, but it has 
been authorized and used in a few high-profile cases. To this point, it thus appears that 
rebalancing in the WTO dispute settlement system has occurred more often through the 
suspension of concessions (i.e., the use of countermeasures) than through compensation. 
 
According to DSU Article 22.1, compensation “is voluntary and, if granted, shall be 
consistent with the covered agreements.” Compensation is normally envisioned as trade 
compensation, whereby the infringing Member compensates the complaining Member by 
reducing tariffs on other goods. In light of the MFN provisions contained in GATT 
Article I:1, it is broadly accepted that trade compensation must be offered on a 
nondiscriminatory (MFN) basis.15 Other forms of compensation are not precluded, 
however, and parties are free to pursue monetary compensation as well. In fact, monetary 
compensation was agreed upon in the US-Copyright case as part of the DSU Article 25 
Arbitration proceedings. This case seems to indicate that monetary compensation need 
not be granted on an MFN basis.16 The suspension of concessions is permitted only on a 
discriminatory basis. 
 
Many commentators express disappointment that compensation is rarely used as a WTO 
remedy. Observed behavior suggests that the infringing Member may prefer to suffer the 
possibility of authorized retaliation than to offer acceptable compensation. This has led to 
proposals that retaliation be made more severe and that compensation be made more 
appealing. In this section, I consider two aspects of this debate. I first explore the case for 
more severe countermeasures. I then consider whether the use of monetary compensation 
should be further encouraged. 
 
3a. Disproportionate Retaliation 
 
In the preceding section, I discuss the extent to which commensurate retaliation facilitates 
efficient breach. As noted there, in a simple setting with two goods, two countries and 
import tariffs as the only trade-policy instrument, if the domestic government experiences 
a change in political circumstances and raises it tariff, then the foreign government can 
maintain the terms of trade by withdrawing an equivalent concession of its own. The 
                                                                                                                                            
complainant, in only 16% of the disputes (a total of 10 disputes) was there no implementation or a 
disagreement between the parties with regard to the implementation. Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger 
(2006a) consider bilateral disputes through June 30, 2003 and focus on those in which implementation did 
not occur and the complainant had the option to request and impose countermeasures. Their analysis 
highlights that countermeasures had not been applied by developing countries, even when faced with non-
implementation. 
14 As discussed below, compensation was agreed upon in the US-Copyright case. For additional discussion 
of the US-Copyright case, see also Grossman and Mavroidis (2003) and O’Connor and Djordjevic (2005). 
15 It is conceivable, though, that compensation could occur on a discriminatory basis, if the infringing 
Member were to offer a reduction in a legal but discriminatory measure (e.g., a legitimate anti-dumping 
duty) as compensation. 
16 Bronckers and van den Broek (2005) and Davies (2006) offer arguments in support of the view that the 
DSU allows for monetary compensation that is not granted on an MFN basis. O’Connor and Djordjevic 
(2005) express some reservations about this interpretation, however. 
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welfare of the foreign government is not preserved, however, since the local prices in the 
foreign country are changed as a consequence of the increase in the foreign tariff. In other 
words, commensurate retaliation preserves the terms of trade but results in a reduced 
trade volume. Hence, if at the originally negotiated tariffs the foreign government would 
have preferred (weakly) more trade, given the terms of trade, then commensurate 
retaliation leaves the foreign government with less welfare than it would have enjoyed at 
the initially negotiated tariffs.17 
 
In this situation, a remedy system that allows for disproportionate retaliation has some 
theoretical appeal. If the foreign government were to withdraw a greater-than-equivalent 
concession, then it would enjoy improved terms of trade at the post-retaliation tariffs 
relative to the initially negotiated tariffs. This terms-of-trade gain could then compensate 
the foreign government for the change in local prices and resulting diminished trade 
volume. In principle, if a disproportionate countermeasure of the right size were selected, 
then the foreign government’s welfare could be preserved. The domestic government 
would then only breach its commitments, thus initiating the retaliatory sequence, if it 
achieved higher welfare after retaliation than at the initially negotiated tariffs. Thus, when 
disproportionate retaliation is allowed, it is possible that any breach would be efficient.18  
 
A novel conclusion suggested by this line of reasoning is that the optimal degree of 
disproportion should vary with the level of the initial violation. All else equal, if the 
breach of the domestic government involves the withdrawal of a larger concession, then 
after withdrawing a substantially equivalent concession and preserving the terms of trade 
the foreign government would suffer a larger trade volume reduction. A bigger terms-of-
trade gain would then be required to maintain the foreign government’s welfare, and all 
else equal a more disproportionate countermeasure would thus be required.19 
  
At a practical level, however, the potential appeal of a dispute settlement system that 
facilitates efficient breach in this way is subject to two important qualifications. The first 
qualification concerns the application of such an approach to a more realistic setting in 
which trading patterns involve multiple countries. As previously discussed, the non-
                                                
17 The remaining case – where the foreign government prefers less trade given the terms of trade – is of 
course also possible. Arguably, this case represents a less likely starting point, however. At such tariffs, the 
foreign government would have incentive to withdraw a concession and induce a substantially equivalent 
withdrawal from the domestic government, as it then obtains less trade without altering the terms of trade. 
The foreign government could accomplish this, for example, through a renegotiation under GATT Article 
XXVIII or by undertaking its own violation and causing an equivalent suspension of concessions under 
WTO dispute settlement procedures. 
18 Retaliation in the WTO is prospective and is authorized only after a sometimes lengthy judicial process; 
thus, in principle, a remedy system with disproportionate retaliation might also facilitate efficient breach by 
generating a post-retaliation terms-of-trade gain for the complaining Member that could offset the terms-of-
trade loss experienced by this Member over the time following the initial imposition of the offending 
measure and preceding the authorization of retaliation. 
19 By the same logic, for smaller violations, commensurate retaliation becomes more attractive. Under the 
assumption that governments negotiate to their “politically optimal” tariffs (as defined in Bagwell and 
Staiger (1999, 2002 (Chapter 5), 2005a)), Howse and Staiger (2005) argue that commensurate retaliation 
facilitates efficient breach in an approximate sense when the initial violation is sufficiently small. 
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discrimination rule (MFN) and the principle of reciprocity work well together, in the 
sense that under plausible trading patterns bilateral trade-policy adjustments that satisfy 
MFN and reciprocity leave unaltered other countries’ terms of trade and thus impose no 
“third-party” externalities on the governments of these countries.20 Renegotiation as 
allowed under GATT Article XXVIII can be reasonably expected to occur on an MFN 
basis and satisfy the principle of reciprocity; thus, it has the attractive feature of 
preserving the welfare of governments not participating in the renegotiation.21 By 
contrast, the WTO dispute settlement system authorizes retaliation that takes a 
discriminatory form. If retaliation were also disproportionate, then the principle of 
reciprocity would fail as well. Third-party externalities are thus expected under the 
existing rules for authorized (discriminatory) retaliation, and the possibility is raised that 
a modified system with disproportionate retaliation might increase the extent to which 
such third-party externalities occur. At the same time, it is also possible that a modified 
system with discriminatory and disproportionate retaliation could generate positive third-
party externalities.22 At this stage, it thus seems fair to conclude that the potential third-
party externalities that might be encouraged by a system with disproportionate retaliation 
are poorly understood and require further research.  
 
As Howse and Staiger (2005) also emphasize, the second and perhaps more fundamental 
qualification concerns the measurement of the welfare-preserving disproportionate 
countermeasure. The welfare function of the foreign government is influenced by 
political and economic considerations, and it would seem virtually impossible to 
determine the precise terms-of-trade improvement that is required to offset the subtle 
political-economic welfare effects of altered local prices. To make such a determination, 
the arbitrator as usual would need to assess the trade effects of the original measure and 
the induced (and now disproportionate) suspension of concessions; in addition, the 
arbitrator would now need to understand how changes in trade volumes interact with 
political pressures and economic adjustment costs in the foreign country and thereby 
translate into changes in the foreign government’s welfare.23 
 
                                                
20 For a proof of this result, see Bagwell and Staiger (2002 (Chapter 5), 2005a). 
21 For further discussion of GATT Article XXVIII, see Mavroidis (2005, pp. 87-102).  
22 In the three-country model described previously, for example, foreign country 1 would enjoy a terms-of-
trade gain if the home government raised its MFN tariff and the government of foreign country 2 retaliated 
in a disproportionate way, as the world price of foreign country 1’s import good would then fall more than 
that of its export good. For empirical evidence consistent with the existence of substantial third-party 
terms-of-trade externalities, see Bown and Crowley (2006, forthcoming) and Chang and Winters (2001). 
23 As Spamann (2006) argues, arbitrators seem already to face significant difficulties in determining 
commensurate retaliation, and especially so in cases that do not involve tariff measures. Under DSU Article 
22.4, the level of retaliation should be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. Spamann 
(2006, p. 34) explains that WTO arbitration proceedings and decisions endorse the use of “trade effects” in 
determining equivalence. This use is consistent with the definition of reciprocity employed in Bagwell and 
Staiger (1999, 2002 (Chapter 4), 2005a) and in my discussion above. See also Howse and Staiger (2005) 
for further discussion of the relationship between the measurement of trade effects at original exporter 
prices and the principle of reciprocity. Spamann argues, however, that arbitrators often use different 
methods of calculating trade effects when considering impairment and suspension, respectively, and in 
practice significantly miscalculate the level of impairment. 
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In sum, a modified dispute settlement system that allows for disproportionate retaliation 
has potential theoretical appeal as a means of facilitating efficient breach in bilateral 
disputes. At a practical level, however, the implications of such a system for third-party 
government welfare require further consideration, and the effectiveness of such a system 
in even a purely bilateral context is uncertain due to the high information and 
measurement demands that would be placed upon arbitrators. 
 
3b. Monetary Compensation 
 
I consider now whether the compensation option might be more attractive if monetary 
rather than trade compensation were used. Recent events suggest a growing perception 
that monetary compensation might play a valuable role. As Davies (2006, pp. 40-1) 
reports, as part of the proposals submitted in connection with the DSU review, a number 
of developing countries have encouraged greater use of monetary compensation. 
Monetary compensation was also recently used in the US-Copyright case, as noted above. 
Additionally, the US has entered into free trade agreements that grant monetary 
compensation under certain conditions.24 
 
One potential advantage of monetary over trade compensation is that monetary 
compensation may be a more efficient instrument with which to achieve welfare transfers 
across governments. The domestic government can transfer welfare to the foreign 
government by cutting a domestic tariff (trade compensation) or permitting a higher 
foreign tariff (retaliation). In each case, the transfer occurs through the induced change in 
the terms of trade. The tariff changes may also alter local prices, however, and thereby 
introduce internal inefficiencies. In principle, a monetary transfer may then be preferred. 
As Sykes (2005a) correctly argues, however, governments face budget constraints and 
taxes may be required to finance such a monetary compensation. The use of taxes, in 
turn, may introduce distortions into the economy.  Thus, while welfare transfers across 
governments may be most efficiently achieved using monetary compensation, this 
advantage may be smaller than is often presumed. 
 
A second potential advantage of monetary compensation is that this form of 
compensation may limit the scope for third-party externalities. In particular, Davies 
(2006) argues that a potential limitation of trade compensation is that it must be extended 
on a non-discriminatory basis. It is thus possible that trade compensation is rarely used, 
since compensation of this kind would typically require that an infringing government 
reduce an MFN tariff and thereby extend benefits to the complaining government as well 
as all other third-party governments whose countries export the relevant product. By 
contrast, monetary compensation can be offered on a purely bilateral basis. By ensuring 
that the benefits associated with the compensatory action are exclusively received by the 
complaining government, a dispute system that features monetary compensation may 
                                                
24
 The texts of these agreements are available on the web pages of the USTR at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Section_Index.html 
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better enable the infringing and complaining governments to negotiate mutually 
acceptable compensation.25 
 
Some argue that a disadvantage of monetary compensation is that it is infeasible, since 
damages are difficult to calculate.26 This problem does not seem insurmountable, 
however. In current practice, an assessment must be made as to the level of nullification 
or impairment that is caused by a WTO-inconsistent measure. This calculation is usually 
made on the basis of the trade effects of the measure (i.e., the value of lost trade). The 
calculation in turn informs the level of permitted retaliation, which should entail an 
“equivalent” withdrawal of concessions. In principle, the same nullification-or-
impairment calculation could be used in determining the level of monetary compensation, 
and indeed the arbitrators in the US-Copyright case proceeded in this way. If anything, 
the necessary calculations might be easier when monetary compensation is agreed upon 
than when a level of authorized retaliation is determined. In the latter case, an assessment 
also must be made as to whether the concession withdrawal under consideration would 
induce trade effects that were equal to the level of nullification or impairment. 
 
It is also sometimes argued that monetary compensation is not enforceable. The concern 
here is that a government that refuses to comply and bring its measure into conformity 
with its WTO obligations may also refuse to offer monetary compensation. This concern 
is real and suggests that it would be unwise to make any change in the dispute settlement 
system under which monetary compensation would become mandatory. A more sensible 
approach would be to follow the existing dispute settlement system and provide that the 
offending government would face the possibility of authorized retaliation if it did not 
provide acceptable (monetary or trade) compensation.27 If monetary compensation is 
more attractive to the disputants than trade compensation, it is possible that the infringing 
government might sometimes prefer monetary compensation to retaliation even if it 
would prefer retaliation to trade compensation. To the extent that monetary compensation 
facilitates rebalancing in a more efficient manner than does retaliation, it is thus possible 
that greater use of monetary compensation would improve the functioning of the dispute 
settlement system. 
                                                
25 Consider the three-country model examined previously. Suppose that the government of foreign country 
2 raises its tariff and thereby violates its WTO obligations, and that the government of the home country is 
authorized to undertake an equivalent and discriminatory tariff increase. The government of foreign 
country 1 would then enjoy a welfare gain: its country experiences a terms-of-trade gain, since the initial 
tariff hike lowers the world price of its import good and the retaliatory tariff hike raises the world price of 
its export good. Suppose now that the government of foreign country 2 provides monetary compensation to 
the home-country government and avoids thereby the imposition of a retaliatory tariff hike. The 
government of foreign country 1 would still gain, due to the initial tariff hike; however, its gain would now 
be reduced, due to the elimination of the retaliatory tariff hike. Thus, in this case, a system that utilizes 
monetary compensation limits the scope for positive third-party externalities. Monetary compensation may 
thus facilitate efficient breach. Bagwell and Staiger (2006b) explore related themes and suggest that 
monetary compensation that is offered in exchange for tariff liberalization can impose negative third-party 
externalities and lead to inefficiencies. 
26
 I won’t attempt to list and evaluate all of the suggested advantages and disadvantages of monetary 
compensation. For a more extensive discussion, see Bronkers and van den Broek (2005) and Davies (2006). 
27 For further discussion of the enforcement of monetary compensation, see Bagwell and Staiger (2005b), 
Limao and Saggi (2005), Matsushita (2005) and Sykes (2005a). 
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While the retaliation backstop may facilitate the enforcement of monetary compensation 
among large countries, the threat of retaliation may be much less persuasive when a 
smaller country wins a dispute against a larger country. A small-country complainant 
thus may not have sufficient power to induce monetary compensation from a trading 
partner whose measure is found to be in violation of its WTO obligations. Thus, a system 
that features monetary compensation could introduce a fairness concern, to the extent that 
such a system would bring benefits that would be enjoyed mainly by large-country 
complainants. This concern motivates the consideration of tradable retaliation rights, to 
which I turn in the next section. 
 
In sum, the increased attention that is being given to monetary compensation is probably 
a positive development. In the main, monetary compensation represents an additional and 
perhaps more efficient instrument that governments may use to achieve efficiency-
enhancing rebalancing. Dispute settlement reforms that promote the use of monetary 
compensation may thus be attractive.28  
 
4. Tradable Retaliation 
 
As a last resort, the WTO dispute settlement procedures authorize a complainant country 
to retaliate against a trading partner who is in violation of its WTO obligations. If the 
trading partner brings its measure into compliance, or offers acceptable compensation, 
then the retaliation option is not activated. But the threat of retaliation cast a shadow even 
when it does not occur. The violating trading partner is more inclined to comply or offer 
suitable compensation if the threat of retaliation is significant. In turn, the threat of 
retaliation may have little significance to the violating trading partner if the complainant 
country is relatively small. This conclusion emerges directly from the analytic framework 
presented in Section 2. In the extreme case where the complainant country is truly small, 
any retaliatory tariff that might be imposed by this country would have no effect on world 
prices and would thus leave the terms of trade – and hence the welfare of the government 
of the violating trading partner – unaffected. A complainant country in this situation is 
unable to effectively retaliate, should retaliation be authorized, and is therefore also in a 
poor position to use the threat of retaliation as a means to induce compliance or achieve 
an acceptable offer of compensation.29 
 
                                                
28
 For example, as Fukunaga (2006, pp. 413-4) suggests, compensation might be more feasible if arbitral 
procedures similar to those in Article 22.6 were introduced so as to determine the level of nullification and 
impairment and thereby provide guidance for parties at an earlier stage when they may be seeking to 
determine an acceptable level of compensation. Fukunaga (2006, p. 414) notes that some countries have 
made proposals for an amendment that would explicitly allow the complaining member to request an 
arbitrator to determine the level of nullification or impairment. 
29
 Bown (2004a,b) reports empirical findings that are consistent with the idea that retaliation is less 
effective for smaller countries. Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2006a) examine all disputes brought before 
the WTO from its inception on January 1, 1995 through June 30, 2003 and also report consistent evidence. 
They do not find any dispute in which a developing country (defined as a non-OECD member) imposed 
countermeasures to induce compliance even when faced with non-implementation. 
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As a consequence of such considerations, many small and developing countries have 
expressed frustration with their ability to utilize the WTO dispute settlement procedures 
in an effective fashion. Some of the key concerns are expressed with particular force in a 
DSU reform proposal submitted by Mexico (WTO, 2002). Mexico proposes several 
changes, but perhaps the most provocative proposal is that the right of retaliation be made 
tradable. To see what this might entail, suppose that the government of some country 
wins a ruling against a trading partner and is thus authorized to suspend concessions to 
this partner up to a level that is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. 
Suppose further that the government of this country is unwilling to retaliate itself. This 
supposition is especially plausible for the government of a small country, since the full 
effect of the retaliatory tariff would then be passed through to the local price of the 
import good. If retaliation rights were tradable, such a country could trade the right of 
retaliation to another country that might value and utilize this right. As Mexico explains, 
“…this concept might help address the specific problem facing Members that are unable 
to suspend concessions effectively.” (WTO, 2002, p. 6) 
 
As Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2006b) argue, the problem of ineffective retaliation 
that confronts small and developing countries may be interpreted in two very different 
ways. The first interpretation is dismissive. According to this interpretation, in a 
reciprocal trade negotiation, the government of a country receives the benefit of a 
reduced tariff from its trading partner and likewise offers to its trading partner the benefit 
of a reduction in its own tariff. Of course, if the government has the ability to offer such a 
benefit, then it similarly is able to achieve effective retaliation by withdrawing this 
benefit. Thus, the problem of ineffective retaliation can arise only for governments that 
anyway have not offered any real benefits in prior negotiations. The second interpretation 
is accommodative and stresses that the world community may have a special interest in 
the welfare of small and developing countries. Advocates of this interpretation might also 
stress that small and developing countries often value heavily the growth of their export 
industries; as a consequence, if a developed country violates its WTO obligations and 
restricts access to its market, the government of a small and developing country may 
suffer a significant welfare loss even after the application of commensurate retaliation. 
 
The Mexican proposal highlights two potential benefits that tradable retaliation rights 
might provide. First, such a system might facilitate the rebalancing of concessions, by 
ensuring that the harmed country receives some compensation in exchange for its right to 
retaliate. Second, such a system might also improve the incentive for compliance, since 
the government of an infringing country is more likely to bring its policies into 
conformity with its WTO obligations when a greater prospect of effective retaliation 
exists. Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2006b) suggest a third potential benefit: a system 
with tradable retaliation rights may ensure that an existing right of retaliation is more 
efficiently allocated, by increasing the likelihood that the WTO Member who exercises 
this right is also the Member who values the right most highly. 
 
It is possible to imagine several ways in which trade in retaliation rights might be 
structured. The Mexican proposal does not offer any specific recommendations with 
regard to the structure of trade in retaliation rights. Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger 
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(2006b) explore the case of auctioning countermeasures in the WTO.30 Their main points 
can be understood with reference to the three-country model discussed previously. 
Imagine that the government of the home country violates its WTO obligations and 
thereby nullifies or impairs the benefits of some small and developing country. The small 
and developing country brings the case before the WTO and ultimately wins the right to 
retaliate. It thus has the right to suspend concessions against the home country up to the 
level of the nullification or impairment. Suppose, though, that it puts this right up for sale 
and conducts an auction. The governments of foreign countries 1 and 2 are two of the 
potential bidders in this auction. Each of these countries imports the home country’s 
export good and is able to retaliate effectively and impose a terms-of-trade loss on the 
home country. The government of the home country is another potential bidder. Rather 
than face retaliation from foreign country 1 or 2, the government of this country may 
prefer to win the auction and retire the right of retaliation against it. 
 
In this context, Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2006b) consider two auction formats. In 
the basic auction, the governments of foreign countries 1 and 2 are the only bidders. The 
high bidder wins and exercises the right of retaliation. If neither foreign government is 
willing to place a bid, then the right of retaliation is not sold and no retaliation occurs. In 
the extended auction, by contrast, the government of the home country is also allowed to 
bid. The high bidder again wins, with retaliation occurring if the government of a foreign 
country wins and no retaliation occurring if the government of the home country wins.  
 
The potential benefits of tradable retaliation rights can be assessed in this modeling 
framework. In broad terms, greater expected revenue for the small and developing 
country may be associated with an improvement in the extent to which concessions are 
rebalanced. Likewise, the incentive for compliance may be measured in terms of the 
welfare cost inflicted on the government of the home country. Finally, efficiency can be 
assessed by examining the impact of the different auction formats on the combined 
welfare of the affected governments. 
 
The analysis assumes that the government of each foreign country has some private 
information as to the extent to which it would value the right to impose a higher tariff. In 
particular, each foreign government is privately informed about the weight that it attaches 
to the profits of import-competing firms in its welfare function. A government with a 
higher political-economy shock weighs the profits of import-competing firms more 
heavily in comparison to consumer welfare than does a government with a lower 
political-economy shock.31 Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2006b) show that the 
government of each foreign country would prefer that the other foreign government win 
the auction and retaliate over the alternative that no retaliation is imposed. The simple 
intuition is that both foreign countries enjoy a terms-of-trade gain when retaliation by 
                                                
30 For a non-technical summary, see also Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2006a). 
31 In the formal model, the political-economic shock corresponds to a parameter that is continuously 
distributed over an interval. Each foreign government privately observes its realized shock. Below, I 
sometimes refer to the realized shock as being “high”. This means that the parameter belongs to a sub-
interval containing the highest possible realizations. Similar remarks apply when the words “low” and 
“intermediate” are used. 
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either foreign government is imposed, since retaliation lowers the world price of their 
common import good. Whether a foreign government would prefer to win the right of 
retaliation over the alternative that the other foreign government wins this right then 
depends on the former government’s political-economic shock. Intuitively, a foreign 
government with a higher shock expects a greater gain from winning the auction and 
exercising the right of retaliation, since such a government gains more by retaliating and 
raising the local price of its import good.  
 
In the basic auction, as Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2006b) show, these features can 
lead to novel bidding behavior. At one extreme, a foreign government bids aggressively 
and hopes to win the right of retaliation when it has a high political-economic shock. At 
the other extreme, when a foreign government has a low political-economic shock, it is 
particularly attentive to the interests of its consumers and elects not to bid for the right to 
retaliate. A foreign government with a low shock thus free rides, as it gambles that the 
other foreign government will make a bid, win the right to retaliate and thereby generate 
a terms-of-trade gain for both foreign countries. Finally, when a foreign government has 
a political-economy shock that falls in an intermediate interval, it bids at the minimal 
level (i.e., at the reserve price) in order to ensure that some government bids and thus that 
retaliation actually occurs. Such a government, though, hopes that the other foreign 
government has a high political-economic shock and thus bids aggressively and exercises 
the right to retaliate.  
 
The basic auction allocates the right of retaliation among foreign governments in an 
efficient manner (i.e., to the foreign government with the highest political-economic 
shock) when at least one foreign government has a high political-economic shock. 
Otherwise, it may fail to allocate the right of retaliation efficiently. For example, if both 
foreign governments have political-economic shocks that fall in the intermediate interval, 
then they both bid at the reserve price. The right of retaliation is then allocated at random, 
even though one foreign government may have a moderately higher political-economic 
shock than the other. Further, if both governments have a low political-economic shock, 
then neither bids, and “auction failure” occurs. This occurs because each foreign 
government then elects to free ride on the bidding of the other, with the result being that 
the public good of an improved terms of trade is not provided. 
 
It is sometimes argued that a system with tradable retaliation rights would not work, 
because governments would not pay for the right to retaliate. This conclusion follows 
directly if retaliation amounts to “shooting oneself in the foot.” In the analytic framework 
discussed in this paper, however, once governments have reciprocally lowered their 
tariffs to efficient levels, each government would value an opportunity to raise its tariffs 
somewhat, if it could do so unilaterally (i.e., without inducing retaliation). Thus, the 
terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements suggests that governments of large countries 
would be tempted by the prospect of purchasing the right to retaliate. In the basic auction 
just described, governments nevertheless sometimes fail to bid for this right. The reason 
that auction failure happens is not that each government fails to value the right of 
retaliation. Instead, auction failure happens when the foreign governments both have low 
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political-economic shocks, because they each then prefer most an outcome in which the 
other foreign government retaliates. 
 
In the extended auction, the home government is allowed to bid to retire the right of 
retaliation against it. Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2006b) argue that the home 
government can be expected to win this auction, since it suffers the full cost of 
diminished terms of trade when retaliation occurs. By contrast, each foreign government 
shares in the benefit of improved terms of trade when one foreign government retaliates. 
The foreign governments thus have a public good problem and tend to bid less 
aggressively than the home government. Hence, in the extended auction, the home 
government outbids the foreign governments and retires the right of retaliation against it. 
In the extended auction, then, retaliation does not occur, and the home country gives 
monetary compensation to the small and developing country. 
 
It is interesting to relate this prediction to the discussion at the end of the previous section 
concerning the enforceability of monetary compensation. That discussion raised the 
concern that monetary compensation from an infringing large country to a small 
complainant country could be difficult to enforce, since the small complainant country 
could not effectively use the threat of authorized retaliation. The extended auction 
provides a way past this concern. Intuitively, the infringing large country may pay 
monetary compensation to a small complainant country, if the alternative is that another 
large country might win the right of retaliation against the large infringing country. Thus, 
the extended auction offers a potential means of enforcing credible monetary 
compensation from powerful to less powerful countries. 
 
The two auction structures may be evaluated with respect to the three potential benefits 
mentioned above. Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2006b) show that the extended 
auction generates more expected revenue for the complainant country. In this sense, 
rebalancing of concessions is facilitated to a greater extent when the government of the 
infringing country is allowed to bid to retire the right of retaliation against it. On the other 
hand, they show that the compliance and efficiency criteria favor the basic auction under 
some circumstances. Thus, the analysis suggests that the ranking of different auction 
structures depends critically on the kinds of benefits (rebalancing, compliance, 
efficiency) that are sought. 
 
Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2006b) highlight the benefits that tradable retaliation 
rights might provide and consider the extents to which these benefits might be better 
provided by one auction format than another. This work provides formal input that may 
be useful when contemplating the larger question of whether tradable retaliation rights 
should be introduced into the WTO dispute settlement system. They do not claim to 
answer this question, though, since a system with tradable retaliation rights would 
generate additional costs and benefits that are not included in their formal analysis. One 
un-modeled benefit is that the prospect of auction revenue might enable a small and 
developing country to attract private legal support for WTO legal actions that it would 
not otherwise be able to afford. Under the heading of un-modeled costs, it is important to 
list the possibility that the revenue generated by auctions could result in nuisance cases 
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and excessive use of the WTO dispute settlement system. Another potential cost is that a 
system of tradable retaliation rights might cause bilateral trade tensions to grow into 
multilateral tensions. Acrimony across governments could grow, and future negotiations 
could be undermined. 
 
In sum, Mexico’s proposal for tradable retaliation rights is interesting and worthy of 
serious study. One attractive feature of this general idea is that an extended auction, in 
which the violating country is allowed to bid to retire the right of retaliation against it, 
might motivate a large country to offer monetary compensation to a small and developing 
country. The proposal, however, has potentially far-reaching consequences that are at 
present not fully understood. The costs of a system with tradable retaliation rights could 
well exceed the benefits. At this stage, I therefore caution against any explicit change in 




International disputes over subsidies are now a prominent feature of the world trading 
system. In some respects, this is not surprising, since the appropriate treatment of 
subsidies in an international trade agreement is not obvious. A domestic production 
subsidy, for example, can be a “first-best” instrument with which to address a market 
failure that leads to under-production. A domestic subsidy might also be valuable to a 
government with political-economic objectives, as an instrument that enables the 
government to redistribute income toward producers in a favored industry. At the same 
time, some disciplines on domestic subsidies are clearly needed, since otherwise any 
market access concession that is achieved through tariff negotiations could be eroded by 
a subsidy to firms in the import-competing industry. Export subsidies are similarly 
perplexing. An export subsidy lowers the price of the export good on the world market 
and thus improves the terms of trade of the importing country. By this logic, the 
government of the importing country should send a “note of thanks.” But an export 
subsidy may also displace exports from firms in other countries, and thereby upset the 
market access expectations held by other exporting governments. 
 
In this section, I offer a brief review of GATT and WTO rules on subsidies and 
countermeasures. I then present economic assessments of the treatment of domestic and 
export subsidies, respectively, under GATT and WTO rules.  
 
5a. GATT and WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countermeasures 
 
Under GATT rules, subsidies were treated in a fairly tolerant manner. GATT rules 
provided two key mechanisms by which a government could respond to the subsidies of a 
trading partner: countervailing duty (CVD) measures and non-violation nullification or 
impairment complaints.32 In particular, if the subsidy were offered to exporting 
producers, then a government whose import-competing industry consequently suffered 
material injury could unilaterally impose a CVD against the subsidized exports, where 
                                                
32 For further discussion of the evolution of subsidy rules in GATT and the WTO, see Sykes (2005b). 
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the magnitude of the CVD response was calibrated to the size of the subsidy. If instead 
the subsidy were offered to import-competing producers, then a government that had 
previously negotiated a tariff binding on the product in question with the subsidizing 
government could make a non-violation complaint. For such a complaint to succeed, the 
government would have to establish that a new subsidy program was introduced that 
nullified or impaired the market access expectations associated with prior tariff 
commitments and that could not have been reasonably expected at the time these 
commitments were negotiated.33 The subsidizing government would then be expected to 
make a policy adjustment that returned market access to its original level; however, the 
subsidizing government would be under no obligation to remove the subsidy. Under 
GATT negotiations, several signatories also agreed to reduce the use of export subsidies, 
particularly for non-primary products. 
 
In the WTO, the SCM Agreement represents a considerable strengthening of disciplines 
on subsidies as compared to those found in GATT. The SCM Agreement divides such 
subsidies into three groups. First, except as otherwise provided for in the Agreement on 
Agriculture, export subsidies and local-content subsidies are completely prohibited. 
Second, actionable subsidies are “specific” subsidies that cause “adverse effects” to the 
interests of other Members. Adverse effects can take any of three forms: (1) injury to a 
domestic industry, (2) nullification or impairment of benefits, and particularly as those 
benefits arise through negotiated tariff concessions, or (3) “serious prejudice” to the 
interests of another Member. A third category of non-actionable subsidies has expired. 
 
The first two forms of adverse effects are familiar from GATT law as described above 
and are associated with the use of CVDs and non-violation complaints. The concept of 
serious prejudice is more novel. Serious prejudice may arise if the effect of the subsidy is 
to cause a loss of exports by another Member into either the home market of the 
subsidizing Member or a third-country market. In contrast to preceding GATT law, the 
SCM Agreement allows that a domestic subsidy may be actionable independently of 
whether it nullifies or impairs market access expectations associated with a prior tariff 
commitment. Indeed, a domestic subsidy may now be actionable even if the relevant 
product is not subject to a tariff binding or the subsidy already existed at the time of any 
negotiated tariff commitment. 
 
With respect to remedies, the SCM Agreement (Article 4.10) indicates that the 
complaining Member is entitled to take “appropriate countermeasures” if the Member in 
violation refuses to comply and remove an export subsidy or local-content subsidy. The 
meaning of this phrase, and it accompanying footnote, is not entirely clear.34 Given that 
export subsidies are prohibited outright, arbitrators have suggested that appropriate 
countermeasures should be different in nature, and more severe, than would be indicated 
by the principle of equivalence as used in DSU Article 22.4.  As Lawrence (2003, pp. 54-
                                                
33 Several early GATT Working Party and Panel reports clarified the conditions under which a subsidy 
could be determined to upset market access expectations. In effect, these conditions cover the introduction 
of a new or increased subsidy that was not previously included in a GATT schedule and that diminishes 
market access. See Petersmann (1997, pp. 151-4) for further discussion. 
34 For further discussion, see Lawrence (2003, pp. 54-60), Mavroidis (2000) and Spamann (2006). 
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60) details, in the Brazil-Aircraft Arbitration and the United States-FSC Arbitration, the 
Arbitrators decided on a level of countermeasure that corresponded to the total amount of 
the subsidy as opposed to the (smaller) trade effects induced by the subsidy. The 
Arbitrators went even further in Canada-Aircraft II. Following the previous two cases, 
they used the total amount of the subsidy as the basis for authorizing countermeasures; 
however, they then added an additional 20%. After reviewing the Arbitrators’ reasoning 
and decisions in these cases, Lawrence (2003, p. 58) concludes 
 
“According to these views, therefore, when it comes to export subsidies, the WTO has 
implicitly moved away from the paradigm of reciprocity that guides the rest of the 
agreement. Export subsidies are different because there is no reference to their trade 
effects in the SCM. Individual members may undertake responses in excess of the value of 
trade they have lost. When export subsidies are involved, violators should not have a 
mechanism for legal breach.” (footnote omitted) 
 
In short, for export subsidies, violations are regarded more as “crimes” than “breaches,” 
and the role of retaliation appears to be more about inducing compliance than about 
facilitating efficient breach. 
 
A different approach to remedies is used for actionable subsidies. If the Members 
involved cannot reach a mutually agreed solution, the SCM Agreement (Article 7.8) 
provides that the subsidizing Member “shall take appropriate steps to remove the adverse 
effects or shall withdraw the subsidy.” In the absence of an agreement on compensation, 
and if steps to remove the adverse effects or the subsidy itself are not taken, then the SCM 
Agreement (Article 7.9) provides that “the DSB shall grant authorization to the 
complaining Member to take countermeasures, commensurate with the degree and nature 
of the adverse effects determined to exist.” This language seems to suggest that 
countermeasures for actionable subsidies should be based on the level of injury rather 
than the level of subsidy.35 
 
This brief summary of the legal environment would seem to suggest that subsidies, and 
especially export subsidies, are quite harmful to the world trading system. Export 
subsidies are prohibited outright, and case law suggests that disproportionate retaliation 
is, in practice, the “appropriate countermeasure.” Domestic production subsidies are 
apparently less bad than export subsidies but still worthy of special condemnation. A 
government that uses such a production subsidy must withdraw it, or at least remove its 
adverse effects, even if the subsidy does not erode any market access expectation 
associated with an earlier tariff negotiation. By contrast, import tariffs are legal, and 
governments negotiate tariff bindings with the understanding that violations lead to 
commensurate retaliation that preserves the balance of market access commitments. It 
therefore may be expected that the economic case for disciplines on the use of subsidies, 
and especially export subsidies, is stronger than the economic case for disciplines on the 
use of import tariffs. I will argue, however, that the truth is just the opposite. 
                                                
35 The SCM Agreement (Article 11.2) also disciplines the unilateral use of CVDs, as it provides that CVDs 
may be imposed only when an investigation has confirmed the existence of a specific subsidy causing 
injury to the domestic industry producing the like product. 
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5b. The Treatment of Domestic Subsidies: An Economic Assessment 
 
Consider first domestic subsidies. As noted above, a domestic subsidy can be a first-best 
instrument with which to address market imperfections that result in too little production. 
By contrast, an import tariff is equivalent to a production subsidy combined with a 
consumption tax; hence, an import tariff affects both consumer and producer margins and 
is thus a second-best instrument of intervention.36 Subsidies can also be useful to a 
government that seeks to redistribute domestic income in a manner that enhances its 
political-economic welfare. This perspective suggests that governments should be given 
wide latitude when making their domestic subsidy choices.  
 
The other side of the story, however, is that a government can use a domestic subsidy to 
erode a market access commitment that it made as part of a reciprocal tariff negotiation. 
This point emerges directly from the two-country model of trade discussed previously, 
once that model is modified to allow that the home government has available an import 
tariff and a domestic production subsidy. After the completion of a tariff negotiation, the 
domestic government may be tempted to raise the subsidy to its import-competing 
industry. By doing so, it would restrict market access to foreign exporters; equivalently, it 
would lower the world price of the foreign export good and thus enjoy a terms-of-trade 
gain. Taking the argument a step further, if the foreign government were to anticipate that 
its negotiated market access might be eroded in this way, then it might hesitate to offer 
the benefit of lowering its own tariff as part of the initial tariff negotiation. This 
perspective suggests that disciplines on the use of domestic subsidies are necessary in 
order to make negotiated market access commitments secure and thereby promote 
mutually advantageous and reciprocal tariff liberalization among governments.  
 
In light of these two perspectives, how should subsidies be treated in trade agreements? 
Together, the two perspectives actually suggest one approach: allow governments 
flexibility when choosing their domestic policies in so far as their choices do not erode 
their negotiated market access commitments. In other words, following a tariff 
negotiation, a government would be free to alter its domestic policies provided that the 
adjustments do not impose a negative terms-of-trade externality on its trading partner. As 
Bagwell and Staiger (2006c) show, if governments have available a rich set of domestic 
instruments and thus enjoy a degree of policy redundancy, then GATT rules are sufficient 
to ensure that governments can implement efficient outcomes (relative to their 
preferences) using tariff negotiations alone.37 In this analysis, the GATT provision for a 
non-violation complaint plays an important role, as it ensures that a government does not 
erode the market access commitment achieved in its tariff negotiations. The SCM 
Agreement, by contrast, places additional restrictions on the use of domestic subsidies 
                                                
36 This is an instance of the targeting principle under which the optimal intervention is that which directly 
affects the targeted margin. See Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) and Johnson (1965). The advantage of a 
subsidy is lessened if the taxes required to finance the subsidy introduce their own distortions. 
37 Sufficient policy redundancy is present in the two-country model described previously if each 
government has available an import tariff, a domestic production subsidy and a domestic consumption tax. 
See Bagwell and Staiger (2006c). 
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and can thus limit policy redundancy and thereby interfere with governments’ ability to 
structure their tariff negotiations so as to achieve efficient outcomes. 
 
In a limited-instrument setting, however, policy redundancy is lost, and GATT rules are 
no longer sufficient to ensure that governments can achieve efficient outcomes with tariff 
negotiations. Intuitively, a government may then be unable to adjust its domestic policies 
efficiently without impacting world prices and thus inviting a (costly) non-violation 
complaint or a CVD from its trading partner. The possibility is thus raised that the SCM 
Agreement could mark an improvement in a limited-instrument setting. This possibility is 
indeed realized if governments have no legitimate use for subsidies, in which case 
subsidies would not be used in an efficient outcome. As noted, though, due to market 
failures and redistributive objectives, if governments are to achieve an efficient outcome, 
then it may be necessary for them to use domestic subsidies. In this case, as Bagwell and 
Staiger (2006c) show, the SCM Agreement could have a “chilling” effect on the 
willingness of governments to undertake tariff negotiations. GATT rules are then 
preferred. 
 
The potential chilling effect of the SCM Agreement can be understood in the following 
broad terms. Once a government’s tariff is bound, it may be able to stimulate production 
in the import-competing sector only with a domestic subsidy. But such a subsidy could 
then be challenged and potentially removed under the SCM Agreement. By contrast, if the 
government were to keep the relevant tariff unbound, then it would retain at least one 
(albeit second-best) instrument with which to assist the domestic import-competing 
industry. Moreover, if the import tariff were unbound, then a domestic subsidy would be 
less likely to induce a challenge under the SCM Agreement. Intuitively, a trading partner 
might then recognize that if the subsidy were challenged and removed, the government’s 
best remaining option would be to raise its import tariff. This second-best instrument may 
impose even greater costs on the trading partner; thus, a challenge under the SCM 
Agreement would be less likely to occur on a product with an unbound tariff. If the 
domestic government values the use of its subsidy to a sufficient degree, its best choice 
then may be to leave its tariff unbound. In this extreme case, WTO subsidy rules thus 
completely undermine the ability of governments to achieve mutual gains through 
reciprocal tariff liberalization.  
 
This discussion suggests a “Goldilocks” principle for the treatment of domestic subsidies. 
If disciplines on subsidies are too lax, then subsidies can be used to erode market access 
concessions and governments will thus hesitate to undertake reciprocal tariff 
negotiations; however, if subsidies are disciplined too severely, then governments may 
also hesitate to negotiate tariff bindings, since tariffs then may be the best remaining 
means of assisting domestic import-competing industries. At a theoretical level, the non-
violation complaint rules of GATT represent an attractive middle path that may have 
struck the balance “just right.” In principle, the nullification-or-impairment approach 
captured in the non-violation complaint rules allows governments to use subsidies to 
pursue their legitimate domestic goals while at the same time ensuring that negotiated 
market access concessions are secure. In this general context, the SCM Agreement may 
be criticized as imposing disciplines on subsidies that are too severe. At a more specific 
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level, the SCM Agreement also may be criticized for imposing discipline on subsidies 
even when the subsidies do not nullify or impair any negotiated market access benefits. 
 
Of course, in practice, the non-violation complaint rules of GATT have limitations as 
well. At an operational level, what kinds of future policies should be reasonably expected 
at the time of negotiation? Where should the line be drawn in terms of the kinds of 
domestic policies that could be subject to non-violation complaints? Should even non-
specific subsidies be subject to non-violation complaints? Even in light of these and other 
concerns, however, it is difficult to regard the treatment of domestic subsidies in the SCM 
Agreement as an improvement. 
 
5c. The Treatment of Export Subsidies: An Economic Assessment 
 
At an abstract level, an increase in a country’s export subsidy has the same basic 
economic effect as does a decrease in its import tariff. Consider the two-country model. 
As previously discussed, a lower import tariff causes a decline in the terms of trade. It 
also causes the local price of the import good to fall relative to the local price of the 
export good. Now suppose that an export subsidy is increased. This depresses the world 
price of the export good and thus causes a decline in the terms of trade. It also causes the 
local price of the export good to rise; thus, following an increase in the export subsidy, 
the local price of the import good falls relative to the local price of the export good. From 
a trading partner’s perspective as well, an increase in a country’s export subsidy is like a 
reduction in that country’s import tariff, since in either case the trading partner enjoys an 
improved terms of trade. An importing country therefore enjoys a positive terms-of-trade 
externality when the exporting country increases the level of export subsidization.  
 
In fact, in the two-country model, if governments were to select export rather than import 
policies, then the terms-of-trade approach to trade agreements indicates that governments 
would achieve mutual gains though a trade agreement that facilitates a reciprocal 
increase in export subsidies.38 The formal argument is equivalent to that given in Section 
2, where the rationale for a mutually beneficial and reciprocal reduction in import tariffs 
is presented. The common theme is that, in the absence of a trade agreement, 
governments restrict trade more than is efficient, since they don’t internalize the effects 
of their policies on their trading partner’s terms of trade.  
 
From this vantage point, rules that restrict – or even prohibit - the use of trade-increasing 
policies look immediately suspect. How would governments mutually benefit from an 
agreement that helps them restrict trade? Once the question is put this way, it is hard not 
to think of anti-trust policy. A related question arises in that context: How do sellers 
benefit from an agreement to restrict trade? But of course the answer to this latter 
                                                
38 If governments maximize national income, then they would select an export tax in the absence of a trade 
agreement. They would then mutually gain from a trade agreement that pushed the export instrument 
toward free trade. When governments have political-economic welfare functions, they may weigh export 
interests more heavily than consumer interests and thus adopt export subsidies even in the absence of a 
trade agreement. In any case, the general point is that a mutually beneficial trade agreement would facilitate 
greater trade and thus call for more expansionary export policies. 
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question is well known: sellers benefit since such an agreement enables them to raise 
price and earn greater profits. In so doing, however, they lower social welfare, since they 
don’t internalize the costs of their behavior on consumers. The analogy in the trade-
policy setting is that the sellers of a given product are the exporting governments and the 
consumers are the importing governments. The analogy thus suggests that restrictions on 
the use of export subsidies may represent a victory for exporting governments that comes 
at the expense of importing government – and world – welfare. 
 
This analogy can be supported at a formal level once the model is expanded to allow for 
competing exporters. Bagwell and Staiger (2001, 2002 (Chapter 10)) consider a simple 
three-country model with competing exporters. Suppose that countries A and B both have 
competitive export sectors that supply a given product to country C. For simplicity, 
assume that all consumers of the product reside in country C. The governments of 
countries A and B have political-economic objectives, and the associated government 
welfare functions thus place a greater weight on export-industry profits than on subsidy 
expenses. If this weight is sufficiently large, then the optimal unilateral policy for each 
government entails a positive export subsidy. In this model, the sign of the terms-of-trade 
externality now varies interestingly across countries. If the government of country A 
increases its export subsidy, the world price for the export good falls. A negative terms-
of-trade externality for the government of country B is then induced, and its exporters 
earn lower profit. By contrast, the government of country C then enjoys a positive terms-
of-trade externality, as its consumers import the good at a lower world price.  
 
Suppose now that the governments of countries A and B were to form an agreement that 
represents their joint interests. Clearly, they would like to negotiate reductions in export 
subsidies, as they could then reduce the volume of trade and induce a higher world price. 
They would then enjoy higher export-industry profits (i.e., an improved terms of trade). 
Of course, if the governments of countries A and B were successful in this endeavor, then 
the government of country C would lose, since it would suffer reduced consumer welfare 
(i.e., diminished terms of trade). In fact, the total welfare of all three governments would 
likely fall if the exporting governments were successful in reducing export subsidies. Just 
as the analogy suggests, an agreement to restrict export subsidies would help exporting 
governments cartelize their export sectors and represent a victory for exporting 
governments and a loss for importing government and total government welfare.39 
 
Brander and Spencer (1985) also provide formal support for this analogy. In their famous 
strategic-trade model, they utilize the same three-country setting but make the assumption 
that countries A and B both have one exporting firm. The two exporting firms then 
engage in (Cournot) oligopoly competition for consumers in country C. Each government 
maximizes national income in their model; yet, the optimal unilateral policy for each 
exporting government is again a positive export subsidy. Intuitively, by offering an 
export subsidy, country A ensures that its exporter will produce a larger output, and this 
in turn induces the exporter from country B to produce a smaller output. In this way, 
                                                
39 As Bagwell and Staiger (2001, 2002 (Chapter 10)) note, their model can be interpreted in terms of the 
agricultural trade disputes and predicts that net-food importing countries lose under an agreement to restrict 
the use of agricultural export subsidies. 
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country A can strategically use its export subsidy to “shift profits” from country B to 
country A. From here, the conclusions parallel those just developed for the model with 
competitive exporters and politically motivated governments. An export subsidy by 
country A hurts exporter profit in country B but helps consumer welfare in country C; 
thus, if the governments of country A and B were to form an agreement, then they would 
agree to cartelize the industry by eliminating export subsidies.40 Consumer and world 
welfare would fall if such an agreement stood. 
 
At a positive level, the competing-exporter models thus offer a cartel-based interpretation 
for the existence of a trade agreement that restricts export subsidies. Like the two-country 
model, however, these models offer the normative implication that an efficiency-
enhancing trade agreement should not restrict the use of export subsidies; rather, an 
efficiency-enhancing trade agreement should emphasize rules that facilitate trade 
expansion. While it certainly true that important circumstances exist in which the use of 
export subsidies can decrease welfare,41 the competing-exporter models support the 
following basic conclusion: the economic case for rules that facilitate a reduction in 
export subsidies is much weaker than the economic case for rules that facilitate a 
reduction in import tariffs. 
 
My discussion to this point utilizes a competing-exporter model in which the importing 
country has no import-competing firms. If instead the government of country C gives 
sufficient weight to the profits of import-competing firms, then it is possible that this 
government might experience a welfare loss as a consequence of the export subsidies of 
countries A and B. Intuitively, this could happen if the implied reduction in the local 
price of the import good decreases import-competing firms’ profits and thereby induces a 
welfare cost that exceeds the welfare benefit of an improved terms of trade. The 
possibility of a welfare loss for the importing government is somewhat special, though, in 
a couple of respects. First, the importing government can experience a welfare loss when 
export subsidies are used only if it has bound its tariff at a level that is sufficiently far 
below that which it would choose in the absence of an agreement.42 Second, the SCM 
Agreement provides for CVDs in such a scenario, and the importing government must 
gain when it imposes a CVD that offsets the effect of the export subsidy: the CVD then 
restores the original local price and leaves the importing country with a terms-of-trade 
gain, which takes the tangible form of greater tariff revenue.43   
 
                                                
40 Indeed, given that governments maximize national income, the agreement would call for export taxes. 
41 In particular, the competing-exporter models do not include all of the welfare costs that may be 
associated with export subsidies. For example, when export subsidies are used, production may be diverted 
to less efficient firms, wasteful rent-seeking behavior by firms may be encouraged, and in some cases 
existing distortions or market imperfections may be exacerbated. Such welfare costs, however, also may be 
associated with import tariffs. 
42 The fundamental point here is that a government must gain when it selects its optimal unilateral tariff 
and enjoys a terms-of-trade gain as a consequence of a change in trade policy by another government, 
where that change may be a reduced import tariff (as discussed in footnote 2) or an increased export 
subsidy (as discussed above). See Bagwell and Staiger (2002, Appendix, p. 192, equation (A6)). 
43 The rules on CVDs thus discourage efficient breach, since the exporting government can provide an 
export subsidy only if it desires to do so when the importing government is made “better than whole.” 
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Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the broad prohibition of export subsidies found in 
the SCM Agreement is not well supported by the terms-of-trade approach to trade 
agreements. This theory also fails to support the use of disproportionate retaliation in 
response to export subsidies. Indeed, the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements 




In this essay, I argue that the terms-of-trade theory to trade agreements offers a coherent 
interpretation of the purpose and design of the WTO. This theory also suggests a number 
of insights with respect to possible reforms of the WTO remedy system. In particular, I 
argue that a modified dispute settlement system that allows for disproportionate 
retaliation has some theoretical appeal as a means of facilitating efficient breach, and 
especially so when serious violations occur; however, at a practical level, I argue that 
important measurement problems would limit the effective use of such a system. I argue 
as well that rule changes that encourage greater use of monetary compensation may be 
attractive. I also consider the proposal by Mexico that retaliation rights be made tradable 
and develop a theoretical perspective under which such a system could offer advantages. 
A particular advantage is that such a system can encourage a large-country defendant to 
provide monetary compensation to a small-country complainant. At the same time, such a 
system would introduce a number of additional considerations that are at present poorly 
understood. I therefore caution against any explicit change in the DSU to accommodate 
tradable retaliation rights at this stage and recommend instead that the issue receive 
further serious study. Finally, I consider the SCM Agreements and the associated remedy 
system. I argue that the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements suggests that the 
restrictions on domestic and export subsidies in the SCM Agreement are too severe. In the 
same spirit, I argue that this theory suggests that the use in recent disputes of 
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